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 UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH 
CORP.: WHO SHOULD PAY TO CLEAN UP 
INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES? 
AARON GERSHONOWITZ† 
It has been almost thirty years since Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act1 (CERCLA, Superfund, or the Superfund Law), and the 
Supreme Court is now engaged in a major reexamination of the basics 
of Superfund liability.  This reexamination began with Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.(Aviall),2  in which the Supreme 
Court held that a potentially responsible party at a Superfund site 
who voluntarily cleaned up the site did not have a contribution claim 
against the person who caused the contamination.3  This decision 
surprised most experts because encouraging remediation and 
requiring those who caused the contamination to pay for the cleanup 
were among the major underpinnings of Superfund liability.4  The 
decision also created a significant amount of confusion regarding the 
 
 † Partner, Forchelli, Curto, Schwartz, Mineo, Carlino & Cohn LLP, Mineola, New York.  
Adjunct Faculty, University of Phoenix Online Campus.  Louisa Chan, a J.D. candidate at St. 
John’s University School of Law, assisted in the preparation of this article. 
 1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9657 
(2000)). 
 2. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 3. See infra notes 32–48 and accompanying text.  Aviall was responding to a demand by a 
regulatory agency and was a “volunteer” only in the sense that it was not acting pursuant to a 
written agreement with a regulatory agency or in response to litigation.  Id. 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733–34 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing the legislative history and concluding that Congress intended to impose the cost on 
“those parties who created and profited from the sites”); United States v. Ottati Goss, Inc., 630 
F. Supp. 1361, 1398–99 (D.N.H. 1985) (observing that the retroactive nature of CERCLA belies 
Congress’ intent to make responsible parties pay cleanup costs); United States v. Conservation 
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 221–22 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of 
liability on responsible parties), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(1) (2000), as 
recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Keith M. 
Lyons, Jr., Comment, Everyone Pays to Clean Up America: A Discussion of CERCLA Section 
107(a)(3) and the Term “Arranged for Disposal”, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 589, 596–98 (1992) 
(discussing the goals of CERCLA and its legislative history). 
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relationship between Superfund’s contribution provision (§ 113)5 and 
its primary liability provision (§ 107).6 
Federal courts quickly developed a number of responses to the 
Aviall decision, and within three years there was a split in the federal 
circuits regarding whether, in light of Aviall, § 107(a) should be 
interpreted to provide a cause of action for claims by potentially 
responsible parties who voluntarily remediate Superfund sites.7  In 
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (Atlantic Research),8 the 
Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits and approved the 
volunteer’s right to bring a cost recovery action against a person who 
caused the contamination. 
This article will analyze the Atlantic Research decision and argue 
that, while on its face the Atlantic Research decision appears to 
correct the problems created by Aviall, Atlantic Research is really a 
logical consequence of Aviall, and together the two decisions suggest 
a fundamental change in how liability at inactive hazardous waste 
sites should be addressed.  This article will then examine the likely 
consequences of that change in direction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Superfund Law to address the problem of 
“chemical poisons” in the environment.9  The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA),10 passed by Congress in 1976, regulated 
the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes.  It did not, however, 
address liability for hazardous wastes that were released or disposed 
of prior to the passage of RCRA.  These “inactive” hazardous waste 
sites were seen as a major public health risk, and Congress created a 
liability scheme for the remediation of these sites with the Superfund 
Law.11 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 9613. 
 6. Id. § 9607. 
 7. See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, 473 F.3d 824, 
829–37 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing recovery for potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under § 107 
and discussing the circuit split); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 
531–43 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting PRP’s right of recovery under § 107); Consol. Edison Co. v. 
UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2005) (allowing PRP to recover). 
 8. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007). 
 9. See Robert T. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, EPA J., June 1981, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cercla/04.htm. 
 10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992K (2000)). 
 11. For a discussion of the history of Superfund and the reasons for its passage, see ALAN 
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A.  Section 107(a) 
Section 107(a), the primary Superfund liability provision, begins 
by listing four parties who may be held liable: (1) the current owner 
or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or operator of the facility at 
the time of the disposal of hazardous substances; (3) a person who 
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances “owned or possessed 
by such person;”12 and (4) a person who transported waste to the 
facility, if that person chose the facility.13  These four parties are 
commonly referred to as potentially responsible parties, or PRPs.  
Courts have interpreted § 107(a) broadly in accordance with two 
main policy goals: (1) to facilitate prompt cleanup of inactive 
hazardous waste sites, and (2) to impose liability for the costs of 
cleanup on those who contributed to the presence of the waste.14 
In addition to listing the liable parties, § 107(a) defines what 
costs these parties may be liable for, and to whom.  Section 
107(a)(4)(A) provides that the above listed parties “shall be liable for 
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States 
Government or a State.”  Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that the same 
parties shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person.”  Because “response” is defined in the 
statute to include “remove, removal, remedy and remedial action,”15 
the “costs of response” that a private party can recover under § 
 
J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1:1 (2008–2009 ed.).  See 
also H.R. REP. NO. 1016(II), at 5 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120, 6153. 
 12. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 
 13. The text of § 9607(a) defines who may be liable under CERCLA: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section— 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or 
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such 
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the 
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable . . . . 
Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
 14. TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 11, § 1:1 n.16 (citing numerous cases). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (“The terms ‘respond’ or ‘response’ mean remove, removal, 
remedy, and remedial action.”). 
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107(a)(4)(B) are the same as the “costs of removal or remedial 
action” the government can recover under § 107(a)(4)(A). 
Courts have interpreted § 107(a) to provide for strict joint and 
several liability.16  This can create particularly harsh results.17  For 
example, one party can be required to fund the entire remediation of 
a site even though that party contributed only a small portion of the 
waste at the site, and a person who purchased a contaminated site 
without knowledge of the contamination can be required to 
remediate the site even though the purchaser did not contribute to 
the contamination. 
The Superfund Law as originally passed did not address the issue 
of suits between liable parties.  Nevertheless, most courts held that 
one liable party could bring a claim against other liable parties.18  
Recognizing such a claim, which some saw as a contribution claim, 
relieved some of the unfairness of imposing strict joint and several 
liability on one party or a small group of parties when others may also 
have § 107(a) liability at the same site. 
B.  SARA and § 113 
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization Act (commonly referred to as SARA).19  SARA 
included the explicit contribution provisions contained in § 113.  
Section 113(f)(1) provides that “[a]ny person may seek contribution 
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable . . . during or 
following any civil action.”20  Section 113(f)(3) provides a separate 
 
 16. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 11, § 4:11.  The authors summed up a section on joint 
and several liability by stating that “in a very short period of time, so many courts had adopted 
the Chem-Dyne position [holding that Superfund defendants are jointly and severally liable] 
that there was no longer a reasonable basis for disagreement concerning the application of joint 
and several liability.” Id.; see also United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.7 
(2007) (“We assume without deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”). 
 17. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178–79 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that joint and 
several liability “often result[s] in defendants paying for more than their share”); United States 
v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 629 n.15 (D.N.H 1988) (stating that the right of contribution is 
necessary to reduce the “harsh results” that can be associated with joint and several liability). 
 18. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(allowing a third party complaint to go forward); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. 
Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (discussing private party suits and the right to contribution), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(1) (2000), as recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI 
Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
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right of contribution for persons who have resolved their liability to 
the government.21  The legislative history of § 113 indicates that 
Congress was confirming the existence of the right of contribution, 
not necessarily adding a new right of contribution.22 
After SARA added § 113, many courts held that a contribution 
claim could not be brought under § 107(a).23  Additionally, because a 
defendant in an action pursuant to § 107(a) is subject to joint and 
several liability, and a claim between responsible parties was 
necessarily a claim for apportionment of liability like a contribution 
claim, most courts held that liable parties could not bring actions 
pursuant to § 107(a), or if they could, such claims would be treated as 
claims for contribution, not cost recovery.24 
The relationship between a private party’s § 107(a) claim and 
such party’s § 113 contribution claim was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in dicta in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States.25  In Key Tronic, a 
private party brought a § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action against 
another responsible party.  The issue before the court was whether 
attorneys’ fees were within the definition of “response costs,”26 and 
the Court noted that after SARA, “the statute now expressly 
authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly 
authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107.”27 
To understand how §§ 107 and 113 relate to each other, one 
needs to understand the relationship between §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and 
107(a)(4)(B).  The simplest way to view the relationship between §§ 
107(a)(4)(A) and 107(a)(4)(B) is that subsection (A) is for 
 
 21. Id. § 9613(f)(3). 
 22. See S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 44 (1985), reprinted in 3 SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1993); see also 131 CONG. REC. 
S11998-01 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) (statements of Sen. Stafford). 
 23. See United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (2007) (stating that after 
SARA, “many Courts of Appeals held that § 113(f) was the exclusive remedy for PRPs”).  The 
Court said this was based on the need to “direct traffic” between § 107(a) and § 113.  Id. 
(quoting Atl. Research v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 24. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing 
between joint tortfeasors and innocent parties); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 
118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (characterizing the action as one of contribution), overruled 
by Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 523 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing a conflict with 
Atlantic Research). 
 25. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994). 
 26. Id. at 814–15 (noting that attorneys’ fees are generally not recoverable, but that 
CERCLA includes costs of enforcement in the definition of response costs). 
 27. Id. at 816. 
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governmental suits for response costs and subsection (B) is for suits 
for response costs by other parties.28 
A second view of how the two subsections relate to each other 
focused on who the nongovernmental plaintiff may be.  On its face, 
“any other person” seems very broad, and prior to SARA, PRPs were 
permitted to bring § 107(a)(4)(B) actions against other PRPs.  After 
SARA, with the addition of the contribution provisions of § 113, 
courts “direct[ing] traffic between” §§ 107 and 113 reinterpreted § 
107(a)(4)(B), concluding that “any other party” was limited to parties 
who were not potentially responsible parties.29 
 Where did this limitation come from?  Courts read the phrase 
“incurred by any other person” to mean “incurred by persons other 
than potentially responsible parties” by reading § 107(a) as one long 
sentence, the subject of which is the list of potentially responsible 
parties.  Section 107(a)(1)–(4) states that PRPs “shall be liable for –” 
and the “for” is followed by two relevant clauses—“(A) all costs of 
removal or remedial action incurred by the Government[,]” and “(B) 
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.”  
The “other person,” in this understanding of subsection B means 
other than the people listed in (a)(1)–(4), meaning other than a 
potentially responsible party.30 
This reading is consistent with the way most courts understood § 
107(a) prior to Aviall.  That is, before Aviall, most courts held that § 
113 was the sole remedy for a PRP and § 107(a) provided a remedy 
for the government and for others who were neither the government 
nor PRPs.31  This conclusion was based in part on fear that if PRPs 
could use § 107(a), then § 113 would be superfluous. The Aviall Court 
created a situation in which there could be a §107(a) PRP versus PRP 
claim without rendering § 113 superfluous. 
C.  The Aviall Decision 
The Aviall Court held that a volunteer could not bring a § 
113(f)(1) contribution claim because the claim was not “during or 
 
 28. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2334–35 (noting that this was the common reading of the 
provisions prior to the enactment of SARA). 
 29. See id. at 2334; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169 
(2004) (stating that “the parties cite numerous decisions of the Courts of Appeals as holding 
that a private party that is itself a PRP may not pursue a § 107(a) action against other PRPs”). 
 30. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2335–37. 
 31. See id. at 2334; see also Aviall, 543 U.S. at 169. 
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following” a civil action.32  Aviall had purchased contaminated sites 
from Cooper Industries and operated the sites for several years 
before discovering the contamination.33  Aviall notified the State 
regulatory agency, and the State threatened to initiate an 
enforcement action against Aviall if Aviall did not remediate the 
sites.34  Aviall remediated the sites and initiated a contribution action 
against Cooper Industries, alleging that Cooper Industries was 
responsible for all or part of the remedial costs.35 
The Aviall case presented the Court with a conflict between the 
language of CERCLA and the policies underlying it.  Section 
113(f)(1) provides a contribution action “during or following” a civil 
action.36  The language “during or following” appears to exclude 
contribution prior to a civil action.37  Thus, the language of the statute, 
on its face, favored dismissal of the volunteer’s suit.38  On the other 
hand, the policies underlying Superfund—to encourage cleanup of 
hazardous sites and to require those responsible for creating the sites 
to pay the costs of cleanup—argued that a volunteer should have a 
right of contribution and that the party who had caused the 
contamination should not be able to avoid liability.39 
On a deeper level, the issue was less how to read § 113(f)(1) than 
how to read the Superfund Law in its totality.  Prior to SARA, which 
added § 113, most courts read § 107(a) to include an implied right for 
PRPs to bring suit against other PRPs.40  Once there was an explicit 
 
 32. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–66 (emphasizing that Aviall’s failure to satisfy the “during or 
following” condition precluded it from seeking contribution under § 113(f)(1)). 
 33. Id. at 163–64. 
 34. Id. at 164. 
 35. See id. (indicating that Aviall originally asserted a cost recovery claim under CERCLA 
§ 107(a) and a separate claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1) before amending the 
complaint). 
 36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). 
 37. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 508 F.3d 126, 134–35 (3d Cir. 
2007), abrogated by United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (2007). 
 38. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–66. 
 39. See supra notes 4 and 11 and accompanying text; see also Eve L. Pouliot, Coercion vs. 
Cooperation: Suggestions for the Better Effectuation of CERCLA (Superfund), 47 SMU L. REV. 
607, 618 (1994) (reiterating the problem of CERCLA’s contribution provision(s) in practical 
effect). 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1988); Wickland 
Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889, 891–92 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the private 
party claim under § 107(a)); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317–18 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(upholding the private party claim under § 107(a)); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. 
Supp. 1258, 1267–69 (D. Del. 1986) (noting that new § 113(f) ratifies the existing caselaw that 
Gershonowitz__final.doc 3/4/2009  3:08:29 PM 
126 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 19:119 
right of contribution, however, courts reinterpreted § 107(a) to 
exclude PRP suits because no statute should be read to contain two 
provisions that perform the same function.41 
Based on this, Aviall argued that a broad reading of the right of 
contribution was consistent with the way other provisions of 
CERCLA were being interpreted and a narrow reading of § 113(f) 
could have a ripple effect, requiring a reexamination of other 
provisions.42  For example, a reinterpretation of § 113 to limit 
contribution could suggest a reexamination of § 107(a) because there 
would no longer be two provisions providing the same function.43  
Additionally, most courts have concluded that defendants in § 107(a) 
actions are subject to joint and several liability, but a PRP should not 
be able to collect all of its costs.44  Thus, a reexamination of whether a 
PRP can bring a § 107(a) action may require a reexamination of 
whether all § 107(a) defendants face joint and several liability.45  If a 
PRP can collect all of its costs pursuant to § 107(a) and only an 
equitable share of costs pursuant to § 113, why would a PRP ever 
choose to bring a § 113 action?  These questions permitted Aviall to 
argue that holding that Aviall does not have a right of contribution 
 
permits private parties to bring contribution actions under § 107(a)), superseded by statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 113(f)(1), as recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 
2005); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489–91 (D. Colo. 1985) (a potentially 
responsible party may bring a contribution action under § 107(a)); United States v. S.C. 
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994–95 (D.S.C. 1984) (discussing the right of 
contribution), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 176; City of 
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142–43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating that a 
responsible party may bring a § 107(a) action against another responsible party). 
 41. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. 
Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349–56 (6th Cir. 1998); Pneumo Abex 
Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Pinal Creek 
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301–06 (9th Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, 
Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo. & E. 
R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535–36 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 
F.3d 96, 101–03 (1st Cir. 1994); Azko Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 42. Brief of Respondent at 20–22, Aviall, 543 U.S. 157 (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 768554. 
 43. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 159. 
 44. E.g., United Techs., 33 F.3d at 100; see also Renee M. Collier & Timothy J. Evans, 
Department of Defense Affirmative Cost Recovery Against Private Third Parties, 58 A.F. L. REV. 
125, 134–35 (2006) (noting that courts have refused to allow a PRP to recover all response costs 
based on its status as a joint tortfeasor and not as an innocent party). 
 45. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007) (distinguishing 
when a PRP can bring a § 113(f) contribution claim as opposed to a § 107(a) claim to recover 
response costs). 
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could disrupt the Superfund status quo and could lead to other 
significant changes in Superfund liability. 
The Court’s decision in Aviall recognized the conflict between 
the language and the policy, and concluded that the Court must 
interpret the statute as written—§ 113(f) provides for contribution 
claims “during or following” a civil action, but not for a volunteer.46  
The Court also recognized the potential “ripple” effect on other parts 
of the Superfund Law47 and expressed no opinion on the issue that 
would be addressed in Atlantic Research.48 
II.  THE ATLANTIC RESEARCH DECISION 
Atlantic Research voluntarily remediated a site at which it was a 
potentially responsible party as an operator, and brought a claim 
against the U.S. Government, the owner of the site.49  After the Aviall 
decision prevented its § 113 claim from going forward, Atlantic 
Research amended its complaint to allege a § 107(a) claim.50  The 
United States moved to dismiss, arguing that § 107(a) does not allow 
claims by PRPs.51  The District Court dismissed the action and the 
Eighth Circuit reversed,52 joining the Second53 and Seventh Circuits54 
in finding that a PRP who did not have a contribution claim because 
of Aviall had a cause of action under § 107(a).  The Third Circuit had 
taken the opposite view in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United 
States.55 
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that a PRP acting as a 
volunteer can incur costs that are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B).56  
The Court’s reasoning was based largely on an analysis of §§ 
107(a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(B) of the statute and the conclusion that to 
read the statute any other way would render subsection (a)(4)(B) 
 
 46. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–68. 
 47. Id. at 169–70. 
 48. See id. (stating that it was “prudent to withhold judgment” on that issue because it had 
not been briefed). 
 49. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2335. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 827 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 53. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 54. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, 473 F.3d 824 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 55. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 56. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
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meaningless.57  Once the court concluded that PRPs could bring 
actions under both §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(1), the Court needed to 
explain how the various liability sections of Superfund fit together 
and what role each plays.58 
A.  The Relationship Between §§ 107 and 113 
The Court began its analysis by noting that the Superfund Law 
contains two main liability provisions: (1) § 107(a), which permits 
claims to recover remedial costs; and (2) § 113, which permits claims 
for contribution.59  The pre-Aviall law assigned a role to each, 
providing that PRPs could only bring § 113 actions and non-PRPs 
could bring § 107(a) actions.60  The flaw in that arrangement, the 
Court explained, was that § 107(a) really contains two distinct liability 
provisions, and each needs to have a role.61  While § 107(a)(4)(A) 
explicitly authorizes actions by the United States or a State, § 
107(a)(4)(B) authorizes suits “by any other person.”62  If § 
107(a)(4)(B) did not include PRP claims, the Court explained, then 
the phrase “by any other person” would be rendered meaningless63 
because everyone who can make a claim for response costs is either 
the U.S. or a State government (a § 107 (a)(4)(A) plaintiff) or a PRP 
(a § 113 plaintiff).64  Therefore, the Court needed to find a role for § 
107(a)(4)(B).65 
The government had argued, as many pre-Aviall courts had held, 
that § 107(a)(4)(B) was intended to provide a claim  for “innocent” 
parties who are not government entities, and did not provide a claim 
for non-innocent PRPs.66  The Court rejected that argument because § 
107(a) defines PRP “so broadly as to sweep in virtually all persons 
likely to incur cleanup costs.”67  Moreover, the “by any other person” 
 
 57. Id. at 2336–37. 
 58. Id. at 2338. 
 59. Id. at 2337. 
 60. Id. at 2337–38. 
 61. Id. at 2336. 
 62. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2000). 
 63. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336–37. 
 64. Id. at 2335–37. 
 65. See id. at 2338 n.6. 
 66. Id. at 2336–37. 
 67. Id. at 2336. 
Gershonowitz__final.doc 3/4/2009  3:08:29 PM 
Fall 2008] UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP. 129 
language of § 107(a)(4)(B) does not support a distinction between 
private parties based on whether they are PRPs and non-PRPs.68 
After holding that § 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action for 
PRPs, the Court needed to address when a PRP may bring a § 107(a) 
claim and when it may (or must) bring a § 113 claim.69  Or, put 
another way, if private parties can proceed under § 107(a), why do we 
need § 113? 
The Court answered this question by explaining that the two 
sections serve distinct purposes.70  Section 107(a)(4)(B) permits the 
recovery of “necessary costs of response incurred by any other 
person.”71  The prerequisite to an action under this provision is 
incurring response costs,72 which the Court said limits § 107(a) to 
claims for costs “‘incurred’ in cleaning up the site.”73  The Court 
explained that “when a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement, 
it does not incur its own costs of response.”74  Thus, a § 107(a) action 
is available to a volunteer who has incurred response costs (i.e., has 
cleaned up the property), but not to one who has “paid to satisfy a 
settlement agreement or a court judgment” because the party who 
“reimburses other parties for costs” has not incurred its own response 
costs.75 
Section 113 contribution, on the other hand, is the “tortfeasor’s 
right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the 
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share.”76  A 
prerequisite to a contribution action is “inequitable distribution of 
common liability,” which cannot occur without a finding of liability.77  
Therefore, § 113 is available only to the person who has been a 
defendant in litigation or has otherwise reimbursed someone for 
response costs.78 
The Court recognized that the dividing line it was drawing 
between § 107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f) claims was far from clear, and 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 2337–38. 
 70. Id. at 2337. 
 71. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
 72. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 73. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2338 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th ed. 1999)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
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stated in a footnote that “[w]e do not suggest that §§ 107(a)(4)(B) 
and 113(f) have no overlap at all.”79  Specifically, the Court noted that 
a PRP could incur expenses “following a suit” that are neither 
voluntary nor reimbursement of the costs of another party.80  The 
Court did not express an opinion regarding “whether these compelled 
costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a) or both.”81  
The Court cited United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc.82 as a case which illustrates the potential overlap. 
B.  United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 
An analysis of the United Technologies case will provide a better 
understanding of the distinction drawn by the Court in Atlantic 
Research because the First Circuit’s opinion in United Technologies 
rejected this distinction after a thorough analysis, and the Atlantic 
Research Court responded point by point to the arguments made in 
United Technologies.  United Technologies settled an Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) cost recovery action by agreeing to 
reimburse EPA for costs EPA had incurred and by agreeing to 
perform remediation.83  It then brought an action against Browning-
Ferris, asserting claims under both §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f).84  
Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the claims 
were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for contribution 
claims.85  United Technologies argued that the claim was not time 
barred because it was instituted within the six-year limitations period 
for cost recovery claims.86  The court, thus, needed to determine 
whether the claim was a cost recovery claim under § 107(a)(4)(B) or a 
contribution claim under § 113(f).87 
The court began its analysis by noting that § 113(g)(2) provides a 
six-year limitations period for § 107(a) cost recovery actions while § 
113(g)(3) provides a three-year limitations period for § 113 
contribution claims, demonstrating Congress’ intent that §§ 
 
 79. Id. at 2338 n.6. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 83. Id. at 97. 
 84. Id. at 97–98. 
 85. Id. at 98.  The defendants argued that the federal claims were time barred, and that 
upon finding this, the court would lack jurisdiction over the state claims.  Id. 
 86. See id. at 101. 
 87. See id. at 98. 
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107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) create distinct causes of action.88  If they are 
distinct causes of action, the court reasoned, they must arise in 
different circumstances.  The court rejected the idea that a plaintiff 
could proceed under both sections as “untenable,”89 because if a 
plaintiff could proceed under both sections, no one would choose § 
113, and that would “completely swallow section [113(g)(3)’s] three-
year statute of limitations.”90 
United Technologies argued that the dividing line between the 
two provisions was similar to the dividing line later described by the 
Court in Atlantic Research.91  It argued that § 107(a)(4)(B) was for the 
recovery of what it termed “first instance” costs, meaning costs 
incurred in remediating the site.92  Section 113(f) would then be 
limited to the costs of reimbursing someone else for money spent 
remediating the site.93  The First Circuit rejected this distinction, 
reasoning that such a distinction would unreasonably limit the scope 
of the phrase “any other necessary costs” in § 107(a)(4)(B).94  The 
court explained that such a distinction would treat the phrase “any 
other necessary costs” as if it stated “any other necessary costs . . . 
except for monies paid to reimburse government entities’ cleanup 
costs,”95 and that there is “simply no rhyme or reason for reading that 
condition into what appears on its face to be a straightforward 
statutory directive.”96 
The First Circuit made two additional arguments against the 
distinction between “first instance” costs and reimbursement costs.  
First, the distinction relies on “an unusually cramped reading of the 
term contribution.”97  Second, the distinction would “emasculate[] the 
contribution protection element of CERCLA’s settlement 
framework.”98 
The court explained that the traditional meaning of contribution 
is a right of “one who has discharged a common liability to recover of 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 101. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id.; see also United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007). 
 92. United Techs., 33 F.3d at 101. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 102 (quoting Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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another also liable, the aliquot portion.”99  The court explained that 
regardless of whether a party has remediated a site at which several 
parties are liable or reimbursed the government for its remediation, 
such person has discharged a common duty and is seeking to recover 
the aliquot portion.100  The court further noted that the legislative 
history of SARA indicates Congress’ intent to apply the common law 
definition of contribution.101  Thus, treating “contribution” as 
something that occurs only to reimburse someone after litigation 
limits the term more than Congress intended. 
The First Circuit’s reasoning regarding contribution protection is 
based on § 113(f)(2), which provides that one who settles with the 
government “shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding 
matters addressed in the settlement.”102  This provision encourages 
settlement by allowing one to settle and buy total peace because no 
other party could sue the settler for contribution claiming the settler 
had not paid its fair share.103  The ability to buy contribution 
protection, however, is not worth much if other responsible parties 
can bring a § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action after settlement.104  
Thus, the First Circuit concluded that allowing § 107(a) claims by 
PRPs would defeat the purpose of the contribution protection 
provision of SARA.105 
Based on the above, the First Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s 
arguments that the difference between §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113 
centers on the subject matter of the claims (i.e., whether the plaintiff 
is seeking to recover remediation costs it incurred or sums that it paid 
to reimburse another party), and concluded that the essential 
difference is in the identity of the plaintiff—§ 113(f) is for PRPs and § 
107(a)(4)(B) is for persons who are not PRPs.106 
 
 
 99. Id. at 99 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 100. Id. at 101. 
 101. Id. at 100. 
 102. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 
 103. See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 103. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 101–02. 
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C.  The Atlantic Research Court’s Response to United Technologies 
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Research rejected the distinction 
suggested by the First Circuit in United Technologies and responded 
to each element of the First Circuit’s reasoning. 
1.  § 107(a) Will Swallow Up § 113(f) 
In United Technologies the First Circuit concluded that a PRP 
could not bring a § 107(a) action because if a PRP could, then no one 
would ever bring a claim under §113(f).107  The reason no one would 
bring a § 113(f) claim is that § 107(a) has both substantive and 
procedural advantages.108  Most courts impose joint and several 
liability under § 107(a).109  Section 113, on the other hand, only 
permits recovery of the defendant’s fair share.110  The different 
statutes of limitations also provide a reason for a plaintiff to choose § 
107(a).111  Note that in United Technologies, the plaintiff needed the 
longer limitations period applicable to § 107(a) claims.112 
The Atlantic Research Court addressed this issue by creating a 
dividing line between § 107(a) and § 113(f) claims that means that 
very few plaintiffs will have the opportunity to allege a cause of action 
under both sections.113  The Court noted that because costs incurred 
voluntarily will be recoverable only under § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of 
reimbursement of another person pursuant to a judgment or 
settlement will be recoverable only under § 113(f), “neither remedy 
swallows the other.”114 
 
 107. Id. at 103. 
 108. See Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Development, 30 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 74 (2003) (stating the purported advantages of § 107 to recover costs). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 502 F.3d 781, 794 (9th Cir. 
2007); Chem-Nuclear Sys. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twp. of Brighton, 153 F.3d 
307, 317 (6th Cir. 1998); Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Sequa Corp. (In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc.), 3 
F.3d 889, 895–96 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-PAS), 990 
F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-Butler), 964 F.2d 
252, 269 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 110. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007). 
 111. See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 98 (noting the six-year statute of limitations for cost 
recovery actions and the three-year statute of limitations for contribution claims). 
 112. See id. at 103. 
 113. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (demonstrating instances where a PRP may 
recover under § 113(f)(1), but not under § 107(a)). 
 114. Id. at 2338 n.6. 
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The Court also explained that the advantages of using § 107(a) 
may not be so significant because a PRP may not be able to avoid the 
equitable distribution among PRPs required by § 113(f) by choosing 
to impose joint and several liability under § 107(a).  Even for those 
who may have a cause of action under both sections, a defendant in a 
§ 107(a) action could reduce the inequity of joint and several liability 
by counterclaiming for contribution.115  Whether this reduces the 
inequitable distribution or eliminates it needs to be examined.  The 
Court cited Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc. 
(Con Ed)116 as listing cases in which the plaintiff and defendant had 
brought both § 107(a) and § 113(f) claims and counterclaims.117  It is 
possible that in such a case, a court would be required to make an 
equitable allocation.118 
2.  Any Other Costs 
The First Circuit, in United Technologies, concluded that limiting 
§ 107(a)(4)(B) to claims by persons who have incurred “first 
instance” cleanup costs limits the phrase “any other costs” without 
any language in the statute to suggest such a limitation.119  The 
Atlantic Research Court’s response to this argument is that the statute 
does contain this limitation.120  The complete phrase in the statute is 
“any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other 
person.”121  The Atlantic Research Court stated that § 107(a) “permits 
a PRP to recover only the costs it has incurred in cleaning up a 
site . . . . When a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a 
court judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response.”122  Thus, § 
107(a)(4)(B) is limited to claims by persons who have remediated the 
site (“first instance” claims) because only these parties have 
“incurred” response costs.123 
 
 115. Id. at 2339. 
 116. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 117. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339; see also Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100 n.9 (citing 
Blasland, Bouck & Lee v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002)); Dent v. 
Beazer Materials & Servs., 156 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1998); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland 
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1495 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 118. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 119. See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 120. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 121. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 122. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. 
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This limitation is slightly different from the limitation suggested 
by the Second Circuit in Con Ed.124  The Second Circuit reached 
essentially the same conclusion as Atlantic Research, that a person 
who has not paid for the cleanup has not incurred response costs.125  
However, unlike the Atlantic Research Court, which concluded that 
such persons have not “incurred” the costs (they have merely 
reimbursed the person who incurred them),126 the Con Ed court 
suggested that such persons have not incurred “necessary costs of 
response.”127  The court cited United States v. Taylor128 for the 
proposition that “when a party ‘does not conduct its own cleanup, it 
has not incurred recovery costs[,]’”129 noting that the reimbursement 
costs incurred by Taylor were “not costs of response.”130 
By focusing on who incurred the response costs rather than 
whether the costs were costs of response, the Atlantic Research Court 
limited the impact of the case.131  The term “response costs” has long 
been viewed as including many costs that were not strictly speaking 
cleanup costs.132  In Key Tronic, for example, the issue was whether 
certain litigation costs were “response costs” and the Court held that 
fees incurred in searching for additional PRPs were response costs, 
but certain attorneys’ fees were not.133  The emphasis on who has 
incurred the recoverable costs avoids redefining “response costs.” 
3.  Definition of Contribution 
The United Technologies court rejected the distinction between 
“first instance” costs (which do not give rise to contribution claims) 
and costs of reimbursement (which are the subject of contribution 
claims) because such a distinction relies on “an unusually cramped 
reading” of the term contribution.134  The Atlantic Research Court 
disagreed.  The crux of the disagreement regarding the meaning of 
“contribution” concerns whether a judgment against the person 
 
 124. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 125. See id. at 100. 
 126. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 127. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 101. 
 128. United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995). 
 129. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 101 (quoting Taylor, 909 F. Supp. at 365). 
 130. Id. at 101 n.13. 
 131. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 132. See, e.g., Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(suggesting that recovery under CERCLA is not limited to cleanup costs). 
 133. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 811, 820 (1994). 
 134. United Techs. Corp. v. Browing-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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claiming contribution is a prerequisite to a contribution claim.135  Both 
courts agreed that contribution is a common law doctrine aimed at 
preventing or reducing the unfairness inherent in joint and several 
liability.136  It is a claim between jointly and severally liable parties for 
“an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been 
compelled to make.”137  Both courts also agreed that in passing 
CERCLA, Congress intended terms such as “contribution,” that have 
a common law meaning, to include that evolving common law 
meaning.138  Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ discussion of 
contribution is relevant to interpreting the term contribution in 
CERCLA.139 
The Atlantic Research Court disagreed with the United 
Technologies court regarding whether potentially responsible parties 
are joint tortfeasors.  Joint tortfeasors are subject to joint and several 
liability.140  A potentially responsible party who is a § 107(a)(4)(B) 
plaintiff may not be subject to joint and several liability.141  More 
importantly, the Atlantic Research Court cited Aviall for the 
proposition that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) are “clearly distinct” 
remedies.142  If they are distinct remedies, then treating all actions 
between PRPs (which necessarily require apportionment among 
 
 135. Compare Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338, with United Techs., 33 F.3d at 102. 
 136. See Alan S. Ritchie, Note, The Proposed “Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act”: 
The Introduction of Proportionate Liability Into Rule 10b-5 Litigation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 
360 (1994) (emphasizing the policy objective of fairness behind the doctrine of contribution). 
 137. United Techs., 33 F.3d at 99 (quoting Azko Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 
764 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 138. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in 
Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 352 n.96 (2004) (discussing the way the 
common law sense of “contribution” was modified by Congress). 
 139. See H. French Brown, IV, Rebirth of CERCLA § 107 Contribution Actions: New Life 
for PRPs That Conduct Voluntary Cleanups after Aviall, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 218 (2007) 
(noting that many courts found the Restatement (Second) of Torts to govern actions where 
PRPs incurred more than their fair share of cleanup costs). 
 140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF HARM TO CAUSES § 
433A. 
 141. If they are entitled to joint and several liability as the Court implied, then they cannot 
be subject to more than a contribution claim.  See William D. Auxer, Comment, Orphan Shares: 
Should They Be Borne Solely by Settling PRP Conducting the Remedial Cleanup or Should They 
Be Allocated Among All Viable PRPs Relative to Their Equitable Share of CERCLA Liability?, 
16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 267, 267 (1997–1998) (stating that defendant PRPs were 
responsible for all cleanup costs incurred by a plaintiff PRP under the theory of joint and 
several liability). 
 142. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (2007). 
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PRPs) as contribution claims “confuses the complementary yet 
distinct nature of the rights”143 provided by the sections. 
If the rights and remedies are distinct, then the difference 
between a § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff and a § 113(f) plaintiff is not 
merely procedural.  The Eighth Circuit, in Atlantic Research Corp. v. 
United States, had concluded that the only difference between a § 
107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff and a § 113(f) plaintiff is the parties’ “different 
procedural circumstances.”144  What the court meant is that the rights 
and remedies were essentially the same.  The only difference is that 
the person who had been sued could only bring a § 113(f) claim, while 
those who had not been sued could bring a § 107(a) claim (but not a § 
113(f) claim).145 
The Atlantic Research Court disagreed with that conclusion 
because the two provisions provide distinct rights and remedies.146  
The § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff has incurred response costs.147  The § 
113(f) plaintiff has not incurred response costs.148  The statute treats 
those who have incurred response costs differently (as a matter of 
substantive rights) than the person who has not incurred response 
costs and has merely reimbursed someone else for costs.149  Such a 
person is entitled to joint and several liability and has a longer statute 
of limitations.  Thus, the conclusion that not all claims between PRPs 
are contribution claims is based on the conclusion that not all PRPs 
are joint tortfeasors.150  The § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff is a joint 
tortfeasor with the other PRPs only after there has been a judgment 
or settlement.  Thus, the Atlantic Research Court concluded that a 
determination of liability is a requirement to a contribution claim. 
This may explain why the Con Ed court refused to use the term 
PRP.  While courts and practitioners have used the term PRP for 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Consol. 
Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 145. See id. at 836–37 (explaining the vitality of §§ 107 and 113 as available remedies). 
 146. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 147. See id. at 2338; see also Lewis A. Fleak, Case Note, Contribution to Inaction: 
Interpreting CERCLA to Encourage, Rather than Discourage, Hazardous Waste Clean-Up, 11 
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 294, 300 (2004) (affirming that § 107(a) refers to persons who 
incurred cleanup costs). 
 148. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy 
Over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
83, 130 (1997) (pointing out that not all claims by PRPs are for contribution). 
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many years, the Second Circuit took the position that after Aviall, it 
may not be appropriate to use the term PRP because it “may be read 
to confer on a party that has not been held liable a legal status that it 
should not bear.”151  The Second Circuit’s point was that even though 
two parties may, if sued, have Superfund liability, the “volunteer” 
who sues under § 107(a)(4)(B) has a different legal status from other 
PRPs and it may be confusing to use the same designation.152 
4.  Contribution Protection 
The United Technologies court refused to permit PRPs to bring 
actions under § 107(a)(4)(B) in part because that would interfere with 
the contribution protection provided in § 113(f)(2).153  The court’s 
reasoning was that the government’s ability to promote settlements 
by offering contribution protection was an important part of SARA.154  
Contribution protection means protection against contribution claims 
and not protection against cost recovery claims.155  Thus, recognizing a 
cost recovery claim for PRPs means the government cannot protect 
the settling parties against all future suits, which will, in turn, hinder 
the ability of the government to settle cases.156 
The Atlantic Research Court provided three responses to this 
problem.  First, because a § 107(a)(4)(B) defendant can trigger 
apportionment by bringing a § 113(f) counterclaim and a court of 
equity will always take prior settlements into account, there is little 
risk to the settling party that a court will require it to pay more than 
its equitable share.157  Second, contribution protection “continues to 
provide significant protection”158—it protects against all contribution 
claims and very few parties (i.e., only those who performed the 
cleanup) will have the ability to bring a § 107 claim.159  Third, 
“settlement carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as 
to the United States or a State.”160  Thus, the Court believed that even 
 
 151. See Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 97 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 152. See id. at 100 n.9 (recognizing that voluntary cleanup may depend on how § 107(a) is 
read). 
 153. See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101–03 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 154. Id. at 102. 
 155. Id. at 103. 
 156. See id. at 102–03 (suggesting that the CERCLA settlement framework would be 
undermined if a cost recovery claim is recognized). 
 157. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Id. 
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though contribution protection would no longer provide absolute 
protection, it will provide enough protection to continue to encourage 
settlement.161 
III.  THE NEW CERCLA FRAMEWORK 
Pre-Aviall: (1) § 107(a)(4)(B) was only for suits by non-
government parties who were not PRPs;162 (2) all PRPs were viewed 
as joint tortfeasors so that a PRP who performed remediation was not 
treated significantly differently from a PRP who reimbursed someone 
else for performing remediation;163 (3) all PRP versus PRP claims 
were § 113 claims, 164 which are subject to equitable apportionment;165 
and (4) the EPA, in a settlement, could provide protection against all 
future claims arising out of the site.166  Now, each of those statements 
is either not true or subject to significant question. 
A.  Performing Remediation Versus Reimbursing 
Chief among the changes made by the Court in Atlantic 
Research, and the catalyst for some of the other changes, is the 
distinction between performing remediation and reimbursing others.167  
Section 107 is only available to the person who has performed 
remediation because only that person has “incurred” response costs.168  
Why did the Court read this distinction into the statute when most 
prior courts had not? 
 
 161. See id. (“[P]ermitting PRPs to seek recovery under § 107(a) will not eviscerate the 
settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2).”). 
 162. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 99–106, 119–23 and accompanying text; see also Hernandez, supra note 
150, at 105–06 (noting that the two types of PRPs—remediation and reimbursement—were not 
treated differently). 
 164. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United Techs. Corp. v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that a claim of liable parties 
“must be classified as an action for contribution”). 
 165. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal 
Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 29 (2006) (“[A] claim by one PRP 
against another PRP necessarily is for contribution.”). 
 166. See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text; see also Craig N. Johnston, United 
States v. Atlantic Research Corp.: The Supreme Court Restores Voluntary Cleanups Under 
CERCLA, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 313, 325 (2007) (“[T]he settlement bar continues to provide 
significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs.” (quoting Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 
2339)). 
 167. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 168. Id. 
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The Court rejected the pre-Aviall reading of § 107(a)(4)(B) for 
two reasons.  First, courts had read into § 107(a)(4)(B) a distinction 
between PRPs and others that cannot be found in the language of the 
statute.169  Second, by distinguishing between PRPs and others who 
were not PRPs, courts had interpreted § 107(a)(4)(B) in a manner 
that rendered it useless.170 
The Court, however, went beyond simply reasoning that § 
107(a)(4)(B) needs to be reinterpreted because the meaning that 
prior courts attributed to it rendered it useless.  The Court made the 
affirmative decision that just as the simple meaning of the section 
rejects the distinction made by so many earlier courts, the simple 
meaning of the section requires the distinction it was drawing—
section 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action only for persons who 
have “incurred response costs,” and not for persons who have 
reimbursed others for response costs.171 
The Con Ed court read the section similarly, interpreting § 
107(a)(4)(B) as applying only to those who “incurred response costs,” 
not to those who reimburse others.172  The Con Ed decision, however, 
had a slightly different emphasis and this difference goes to the heart 
of understanding the distinction between the § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff 
and the person who merely reimbursed others.  According to the Con 
Ed court, the difference between the remediator and the reimburser 
is whether the costs they incurred were “response costs,”173 while the 
Atlantic Research Court concluded that the difference is who has 
“incurred” the response costs.174  The position taken by the Atlantic 
Research Court maintained the broad definition of “response costs” 
used by prior courts, and thus maintained an expansive reading of 
what the § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff may recover once we decide who 
may be a § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff.175 
 
 169. See id. at 2336 (dismissing the interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B) as distinguishing 
between PRPs and non-PRPs); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99–100 
(2d Cir. 2005); United Techs., 33 F.3d at 100. 
 170. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2337 (stating that acceptance of the distinction between 
PRPs and non-PRPs would render § 107(a)(4)(B) useless because there are no non-PRPs which 
would incur response costs); Brown, supra note 139, at 232–33 (referencing cases that found no 
basis for the distinction). 
 171. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2334, 2338. 
 172. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100 (“Section 107(a) makes its cost recovery remedy 
available . . . to any person that has incurred necessary costs of response . . . .”). 
 173. See id. at 96 n.6 (discussing the meaning of “response” as used in the statute). 
 174. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (“[Section] 107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct 
from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs” (emphasis added)). 
 175. See id. 
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The difference between Con Ed and Atlantic Research in this 
regard is subtle.  When asked who may recover under § 107(a)(4)(B) 
and what costs may they recover, the Con Ed court answered: (1) any 
other party, but (2) only for response costs (which excludes 
reimbursement costs).176  On the other hand, the Atlantic Research 
Court answered: (1) only persons who incurred response costs (which 
excludes persons who reimbursed someone who incurred response 
costs), and (2) they can recover response costs (which retains the 
original meaning of the phrase response costs).177 
For the reasons described below, the Atlantic Research Court’s 
reading of § 107(a)(4)(B) is more consistent with other CERCLA 
provisions, shows a better understanding of the practical reality 
regarding who is a “volunteer,” and helps explain how the Court 
would respond when faced with the overlap case that it left open. 
B.  The Overlap 
In Atlantic Research, the Court noted that the line between the 
volunteer remediator who has a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim and the 
reimburser who has only a § 113 contribution claim is not so clear and 
there could be an overlap—a person who has performed remediation 
and therefore should have a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim, but who is not a 
volunteer and therefore has a § 113 contribution claim.178  The Court 
declined to decide how such overlap cases should be treated.179 
The Court’s reasoning suggests that the remediator who is not a 
volunteer should have a cause of action under both provisions.  
Nothing in the Court’s interpretation of § 107(a) indicates that only 
volunteers may have a § 107 cause of action; the key is incurring 
response costs.180  Indeed, nothing in § 107 or in the Court’s 
interpretation of § 107 indicates that being a volunteer is relevant.181  
The language does, however, limit recovery under § 107 to “costs of 
 
 176. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 99 (“The only questions we must answer are whether 
Con Ed is a ‘person’ and whether it has incurred ‘costs of response.’”). 
 177. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 178. Id. at 2338 n.6. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 2338 (noting that a PRP may be compelled pursuant to a consent decree, 
which may give rise to a § 113(f) or § 107(a) claim, or both). 
 181. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); see also Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (noting that 
“costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B),” but disclaiming that 
voluntary action is necessary). 
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response incurred by any other person.”182  Thus, in the overlap case, 
the plaintiff should have a § 107 claim for the money spent cleaning 
up the property.  The plaintiff should also have a § 113 contribution 
claim for the money spent reimbursing someone else because the 
litigation that prevents him from being a volunteer triggers a 
contribution claim.  For example, if one settled litigation by agreeing 
to spend $100,000 on remediation costs and reimbursing the 
government $500,000 for its costs, the plaintiff should have a § 107 
cause of action for the $100,000 and only a contribution claim for the 
$500,000. 
The Court’s reasoning so strongly suggests that the overlap 
plaintiff should have both causes of action that we need to examine 
why the Court declined to decide this issue.  One reason for declining 
to decide is that the Court’s holding was that a volunteer who 
remediates has a § 107(a) claim.183  The Court was not faced with the 
case in which the plaintiff who remediated was not a volunteer, and 
that issue had not been briefed.184 
A second reason could be the Court’s recognition that in 
reinterpreting § 107(a)(4)(B), the Court was responding to an issue 
created by the Aviall decision, which held that a volunteer did not 
have a § 113(f)(1) claim.185  Whether one was a volunteer or a 
defendant in a civil action is key to determining who has a § 113(f)(1) 
claim.186  Thus, there is some ground to suggest that being a volunteer 
was important in determining who has a § 107(a) claim.187  Whether 
being a volunteer is important in interpreting § 107(a)(4)(B) is 
addressed below in section C. 
Another reason for the Court not deciding this issue relates to 
the contribution counterclaim and the joint and several liability issues 
 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). 
 183. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 n.6. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 2334 (noting that the Aviall decision had “caused several Courts of Appeals to 
reconsider whether PRPs have rights under § 107(a)(4)(B)”). 
 186. The holding in Aviall was that, in order to have a § 113(f)(1) claim, one must have been 
a defendant in a § 106 or § 107 action.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 
160–61 (2004); see also Jeannette Paull, Neither Innocent nor Proven Guilty: The Aviall Services 
v. Cooper Industries Dilemma, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 48 (2005) (recognizing the dilemma 
between those that can and cannot sue under § 113(f)(1)). 
 187. See Stanley A. Millan, Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 
16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 214 (2005) (discussing the application of § 107 on volunteer 
cleanup participants). 
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raised by that counterclaim.  The joint and several liability issue is 
discussed below in section D. 
C.  Volunteer Versus Forced Remediator 
The difference between the way the Atlantic Research Court and 
the Con Ed court read the phrase “costs of response incurred by any 
other person,”188 shows how the courts differed on the issue of 
whether being a volunteer is important.  According to the Atlantic 
Research Court, the person who has a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim is the 
person who performed remediation, because only the person who has 
performed remediation has “incurred” response costs.189  The Court’s 
reasoning does not suggest that whether this person was a volunteer 
has any relevance to whether the person has incurred response costs. 
The Con Ed court, on the other hand, explained that its 
understanding of the term “response costs” is based in part on 
whether the person spending the money is responding to the release 
of hazardous substances or to a claim.190  If a person is a volunteer, he 
or she is responding to the release of hazardous substances.191  That 
person has, therefore, incurred response costs.192  On the other hand, a 
person who merely reimburses someone else due to litigation or 
threat of litigation has only a contribution claim because that person 
is responding to the litigation or threat of litigation, not to the release 
of hazardous substances.193  According to this reasoning, only a 
volunteer can incur response costs.  Thus, if the Atlantic Research 
Court agreed with this interpretation, it would not have any question 
about the overlap case.  The forced remediator would not have a § 
107 claim. 
The difference between the courts regarding the importance of 
being a “volunteer” can also be seen in their policy discussions.  The 
Con Ed court quoted extensively from statements in the legislative 
 
 188. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
 189. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 190. See Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that to 
recover response costs, the party who performed remediation need not have acted pursuant to a 
court order or judgment). 
 191. See id. at 99 (finding that Con Ed incurred response costs when remediating the plant 
sites). 
 192. See id. (adding that the costs Con Ed incurred were not a result of an order or 
judgment). 
 193. See id. at 100. 
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history of CERCLA about the importance of being a volunteer.194  
The Atlantic Research decision contains none of that policy discussion 
and does not cite to that discussion in Con Ed.  The Atlantic Research 
Court, by not discussing the importance of being a volunteer, shows a 
greater understanding of the practical realities because it recognizes 
that, to a large extent, there are no volunteers.  There are very few 
parties who will spend significant sums of money to clean up someone 
else’s mess without any compensation.195  Aviall, Con Ed, and Atlantic 
Research were all threatened with enforcement actions and 
“volunteered” rather than engaging in litigation that they could not 
win.  They were, therefore, not responding to the release of 
hazardous substances as much as they were responding to the threat 
of enforcement actions. 
If the Con Ed “volunteer” was not responding to the release, but 
was, instead, responding to the potential liability, then the Con Ed 
court’s reasoning, based on what the person is responding to, does not 
fit the realities of the case.  The volunteer in Aviall, and accordingly, 
in § 113(f)(1), is a person who has not been subject to a civil action.196  
The Con Ed volunteer, on the other hand, is responding to the release 
of hazardous substances because he is not responding to a civil 
action.197 
The Atlantic Research Court rejected that reasoning.  It accepted 
the Aviall definition of volunteer for the purposes of § 113.  That 
definition, however, does not transplant to § 107(a)(4)(B) because, as 
a practical matter, that person is responding to the threat of liability 
and not to the release of a hazardous substance, and § 107(a)(4)(B) 
provides a cause of action for the person who incurred response costs 
(i.e., the remediator) without any indication that the person’s 
motivation is relevant.198 
The Atlantic Research Court made clear that it believed that 
there are no true volunteers when it stated that “if PRPs do not 
 
 194. See id. at 94 (stating that the goals of CERCLA are to impose liability on responsible 
parties “and inducing those persons ‘voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response 
actions’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119, 6120)). 
 195. See Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (pointing out the 
disincentive of undertaking a voluntary cleanup without compensation). 
 196. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (“Aviall has 
never been subject to [a civil] action.”). 
 197. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 94. 
 198. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007) (giving no regard 
to a party’s motivation). 
Gershonowitz__final.doc 3/4/2009  3:08:29 PM 
Fall 2008] UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP. 145 
qualify as ‘any other person’ for purposes of § 107(a)(4)(B), it is 
unclear what private party would. . . . [A]ccepting the Government’s 
interpretation would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to 
almost zero . . . .”199  The government’s interpretation of § 
107(a)(4)(B) was dependent on the existence of true volunteers,200 
non-PRPs who remediate a site and seek contribution.  The Atlantic 
Research Court took the position that either such people do not exist 
or there are so few of them that their presence is not sufficient to 
warrant recognition in interpreting the statute.201 
Thus, while the Con Ed court believed that it was important to 
encourage voluntary cleanup,202 the Atlantic Research Court 
recognized that in reality there are no true volunteers and those who 
the Con Ed court viewed as volunteers do not need a cause of action 
against other PRPs as an economic incentive to remediate because 
the potential liability faced by such PRPs already gives them 
sufficient incentive to remediate. 
From a policy perspective, the Atlantic Research Court’s 
distinction between reimbursers and remediators upholds a position 
that EPA had been trumpeting.  The government’s brief in Atlantic 
Research argued that CERCLA was never intended to promote 
“wholly voluntary, unsupervised, sua sponte” cleanups.203  The goal, 
according to the government, is to promote “government-supervised 
cleanups and [to encourage] PRPs promptly to settle their liability 
with the government.”204  Indeed, the government is critical of the 
Con Ed court’s discussion of encouraging voluntary cleanups because 
Congress did not intend “to promote unsupervised cleanups at the 
expense of government-supervised cleanups.”205 
 
 199. Id. at 2336. 
 200. Id. at 2336–37.  The Court noted that Congress had exempted some bona fide 
purchasers and the government claimed that these parties could be innocent plaintiffs.  Id.  
However, even if the exemption did create some potential plaintiffs, the government’s 
interpretation of the statute required one to accept the proposition that a statute enacted in 
1980 was meaningless until the passage of an exemption in 2002.  Id. at 2337. 
 201. See id. at 2336 (“[I]f PRPs do not qualify as “any other person” for purposes of § 
107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would.”). 
 202. See Consol. Edison, 334 F.3d at 94, 100 (“[W]e would be impermissibly discouraging 
voluntary cleanup were we to read section 107(a) to preclude parties that, if sued, would be held 
liable . . . from recovering necessary response costs.”). 
 203. Brief for the United States at 39–43, Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331 (No. 06-562), 2007 
WL 669263. 
 204. Id. at 36. 
 205. Id. at 13, 39 (emphasis omitted).  The government interprets all of the references to 
encouraging voluntary cleanups in CERCLA’s legislative history to mean by settlement with the 
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The Atlantic Research Court seems to have accepted the 
government’s position by adopting a distinction between remediators 
and reimbursers that leaves no room in the Court’s plain reading of 
the statute for the volunteer.  That is, § 107(a) contains advantages 
not provided by § 113.  Once it is given that some PRPs are to have 
these advantages and others are not, the Court needed to explain 
which PRPs are to have those advantages—volunteers or all 
remediators.  The Court’s explanation of § 107(a)(4)(B) indicated 
that the statute gave those advantages to all remediators. 
Two additional CERCLA provisions provide support for the 
Atlantic Research Court’s interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B)—the 
statute of limitations triggers and the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP) requirement.  The statute of limitations for a § 107 claim is “3 
years after completion of the removal action”206 or “6 years after 
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action.”207  
In both cases, the statute of limitations is triggered by remedial 
activity, not by reimbursing someone.  The statute of limitations for a 
§ 113 contribution claim is “3 years after—(A) the date of 
judgment . . . or (B) the date of an administrative order . . . or entry of 
a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or 
damages.”208  The trigger is a judgment or settlement, not 
remediation.  This fits in well with the Court’s distinction between the 
remediator who has a § 107(a) cause of action and the reimburser 
who has a § 113 claim.  It also supports the conclusion that being a 
volunteer is relevant to whether one has a § 113 claim (because the 
statute of limitations is only triggered if one reimburses as a result of 
litigation or settlement, thus excluding the volunteer), but it is not 
relevant to the § 107(a) claim because the statute of limitations is 
triggered by remediation without regard to why one remediated. 
The different statute of limitations triggers also help explain why 
the overlap case should provide a cause of action under both 
provisions.  For the non-volunteer remediator, there has been 
litigation or a settlement triggering a § 113(f)(1) claim, and the non-
 
government “rather than a wholly voluntary, unsupervised, sua sponte cleanup.”  Id. at 41 
(quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 537 (2006), abrogated 
by Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331). 
 206. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A) (2000). 
 207. Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B). 
 208. Id. § 9613(g)(3). 
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volunteer remediator has also performed remedial activity that 
triggers a § 107 claim. 
The Court could have also used the NCP requirement to support 
its conclusion that the key to identifying who may sue under § 107 is 
the performance of remediation.  In both §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B), 
response costs are recoverable only if they are incurred in a manner 
that “is consistent with” (or “not inconsistent with”) the NCP.209  The 
NCP is EPA’s codification of “procedures and standards for 
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants.”210  The only costs that it makes any sense to refer to as 
consistent with the NCP are remediation costs.  Therefore, only 
remediation costs are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B), and 
conversely, anyone who merely reimburses another party has not 
incurred costs in a manner that is consistent with the NCP and has no 
claim under § 107. 
D.  Contribution, Joint Tortfeasor Status, and Joint and Several 
Liability 
The Court’s uncertainty regarding the overlap case could also 
relate to uncertainty regarding whether a PRP who has a § 107(a) 
claim is entitled to joint and several liability.  The Court stated that it 
assumes, without deciding, that a § 107(a) plaintiff is entitled to joint 
and several liability.211  However, in the overlap case, where the 
forced remediator has a cause of action under both provisions and 
there is a contribution counterclaim, the Court was uncertain whether 
the contribution counterclaim would turn everything into a 
contribution claim in which each party pays its fair share, or whether 
the § 107(a) claim with joint and several liability would still provide 
some advantage for the remediator. 
Let’s examine a simple example.  Assume there are four parties, 
each of whom contributed equal quantities of the same waste to the 
site.  Equitable apportionment is likely to assign twenty-five percent 
shares to each party.  However, where one party has remediated the 
site and therefore has a § 107(a) claim, that party may be entitled to 
 
 209. Id. § 9607(a).  A difference between subsections (a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(B) is that in 
(a)(4)(A), the government may collect costs that are incurred in a manner that is “not 
inconsistent with” the NCP, while in (a)(4)(B), the private party can collect only if the costs are 
incurred in a manner that is “consistent with” the NCP.  Id. 
 210. Id. § 9605(a). 
 211. United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.7 (2007) (“We assume without 
deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”). 
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joint and several liability, in which case the other three parties would 
all pay one-third and the remediator will recover all of its costs. 
A number of courts have suggested that it is unfair to permit a 
PRP to recover all of its costs.  The PRP is, after all, responsible for 
part of the problem.  For example, in Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United 
States,212 the court addressed the issue of whether a PRP who has a 
cause of action under § 107(a) should be able to collect all of its 
costs.213  The court concluded, based on Atlantic Research, that a PRP 
who is a § 107(a) plaintiff should be entitled to joint and several 
liability.214  The court then addressed the contribution counterclaim.  
The court reasoned that such a counterclaim is not precluded and a 
court may apply equitable considerations to impose some burden on 
the plaintiff.215  A New York court reached the same conclusion in In 
Re Dana Corp.216 
Why does the contribution counterclaim not defeat joint and 
several liability?  That is, in the above example, the contribution 
counterclaim could impose twenty-five percent of the costs on the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff could be left with none of the benefits of 
joint and several liability.  The answer is twofold.  First, the effect of 
the counterclaim requires the application of equitable factors and a 
court of equity could treat the twenty-five percent contributor who 
remediated better than it treats the twenty-five percent contributor 
who did not remediate.  The Atlantic Research Court’s reasoning 
suggests that it should.  Second, and more importantly, is the orphan 
share that is present in almost every Superfund case.217  Most 
Superfund sites contain contamination that occurred many years 
ago.218  There are usually contributors to the contamination who are 
not before the court because they could not be located or they are out 
 
 212. Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Kan. 2007). 
 213. See id. at 1307–08 (highlighting the two issues concerning claims for cost recovery and 
contribution). 
 214. See id. at 1309–13. 
 215. See id. at 1313–14. 
 216. In re Dana Corp., 379 B.R. 449, 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 217. See Thomas W. Church & Robert T. Nakamura, Beyond Superfund: Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup in Europe and the United States, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 26 (1994) (noting the 
issues typically raised in Superfund cases). 
 218. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1480 (2005) (suggesting the need to use forensic techniques and models 
to estimate “the origin and timing of contaminated release”). 
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of business.219  When the other PRPs are subject to joint and several 
liability, they are forced to pay this orphan share. 
Thus, if we take the above case where there are only four PRPs, 
if only three are before the Court, the remediator PRP that has joint 
and several liability can shift the entire orphan share to the two 
defendants.  A fair result could thus have the plaintiff paying 
approximately twenty-five percent based on its equitable share and 
the other two PRPs sharing the other seventy-five percent.  The 
courts in Raytheon and Dana concluded that permitting the PRP 
plaintiff to recover all of its costs and making the defendants pay 
100% is unfair.220  However, by holding that such parties are entitled 
to joint and several liability, the courts have also concluded that not 
providing an advantage for the remediator is inconsistent with 
Atlantic Research. 
The Atlantic Research Court may have left this issue open 
because there are cases where the application of joint and several 
liability may be unfair.  For example, what if there is a very large 
orphan share?  Let’s say there are nine contributing parties, eight of 
whom each contributed 10% of the contamination and one of whom 
contributed 20%.  The 20% contributor remediates and sues the only 
PRP he can locate.  Should a 10% contributor be stuck with 80% or 
100% of the costs when a party who caused more of the problem pays 
significantly less?  The Atlantic Research Court did not decide this 
issue.  If we say that such a plaintiff has only a § 113 claim, the parties 
are on equal footing.  On the other hand, if the plaintiff has a § 107 
claim and is entitled joint and several liability, the said plaintiff should 
not be required to pay any of the orphan share. 
The Atlantic Research Court left open the possibilities that (1) 
joint and several liability would preclude the contribution 
counterclaim, permitting 100% recovery; or (2) the contribution 
counterclaim would wipe out joint and several liability.  The approach 
suggested by the Raytheon and Dana courts, in which both joint and 
several liability and the contribution counterclaim have a role, seems 
to be fairer than either extreme. 
 
 219. See Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future 
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 670 (1992) 
(stating that the parties that are no longer in business and engaged in hazardous dumping may 
be out of the courts’ reach). 
 220. See Raytheon Aircraft, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1310–11 (noticing the potential for PRP 
plaintiffs to fully recover their costs); In re Dana, 379 B.R. at 459. 
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What if there is no Joint and Several Liability? 
To the extent that the Atlantic Research Court questioned 
whether a PRP plaintiff should have joint and several liability, it 
permits the expansion of a divisibility argument that has been 
rejected by most courts deciding Superfund actions.  The Superfund 
Law makes no reference to joint and several liability.  Indeed, both 
the House and Senate versions of the bill that became the Superfund 
Law contained language authorizing joint and several liability which 
was removed shortly before passage.221  Nevertheless, courts have 
consistently applied joint and several liability.  One of the earliest 
decisions to apply joint and several liability in a Superfund action was 
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.222  The court reasoned that the 
removal of the joint and several language from the bill was not a 
rejection of joint and several liability, but was merely intended to 
provide courts with flexibility in determining whether to apply joint 
and several liability.223  The court further reasoned that where a 
mixture of chemicals creates one problem, it is difficult to determine 
what part of the problem is attributable to what part of the 
combination.224  Therefore, joint and several liability is appropriate. 
Courts have generally applied joint and several liability in 
Superfund actions based on the common law of joint tortfeasors. 225  
 
 221. The Senate amendments eliminating joint and several liability were passed on 
November 24, 1980.  126 CONG. REC. 30,987 (1980).  The House amendments eliminating joint 
and several liability were passed on December 3, 1980.  Id. at 31,981.  These amendments are 
discussed by the Chem-Dyne court, quoting extensively from Senator Helms’ speech.  United 
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806 (S.D. Ohio 1983).  Senator Helms explained 
the deletion of joint and several liability as follows: “Retention of joint and several liability in S. 
1480 received intense and well deserved criticism.”  126 CONG. REC. 30,972. 
 222. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802. 
 223. Id. at 808.  To determine whether joint and several liability should be applied, the 
Chem-Dyne court relied on statements in the legislative history that indicate congressional 
intent to rely on common law principles.  Id. at 806–07 (quoting Senator Randolph: “[W]e have 
deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on common law principles to 
determine when parties should be severally liable,” and Representative Florio: “Issues of joint 
and several liability not resolved by this [amendment] shall be governed by . . . common law”). 
 224. Id. at 811. 
 225. Among the early Superfund decisions that analyze the meaning of the statute’s failure 
to address whether liability is joint and several are Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp 1484, 
1486 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Argent Corp., Civ No. 83-0523 BB, 1984 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16976, at *3–4 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); and Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806.  One 
commentator summed up a section on joint and several liability by stating that “in a very short 
period of time, so many courts had adopted the Chem-Dyne position [holding that Superfund 
defendants are jointly and severally liable] that there was no longer a reasonable basis for 
disagreement concerning the application of joint and several liability.”  TOPOL & SNOW, supra 
note 11, § 4:11 (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 
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Numerous courts have used § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to determine when to apply joint and several liability and when 
liability is divisible.226  The comments to the Restatement indicate that 
joint and several liability is appropriate where the actions causing the 
harm interact so that there is one harm that results from the 
combination of the events and each cause is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to cause the result.227  On the other hand, when the harms 
occur in sequence, each adding to the cumulative effect of the other, 
then the causes do not interact; each cause is sufficient to cause the 
problem or some identifiable part of the problem and joint and 
several liability is not appropriate.   
A definition of joint tortfeasor that depends on the interaction of 
the acts of the defendants does not explain why many PRPs have joint 
and several liability.  How can an owner and one who contaminated 
the site be jointly and severally liable?  Their actions did not interact, 
particularly if the owner purchased after the contamination.  They are 
not joint tortfeasors as that term is used in the common law.  
Similarly, parties who sent waste to a landfill that is a Superfund site 
and the remedy is to simply place a cap over the contamination, may 
be another example of where the resulting problem is not caused by 
interaction.  In that case, there are so many contributors that none is 
necessary to the result.  Does the Atlantic Research decision, by 
questioning the applicability of joint and several liability, open the 
door to more divisibility claims? 
Superfund defendants often raise the issue of divisibility, but 
courts have found Superfund liability to be divisible only in very 
limited circumstances.  An example is In re Bell Petroleum Services,228 
where a single environmental harm was caused by operators of the 
same plating facility, each of whom operated the facility for a 
different number of years.229  The court found that they were not joint 
 
1984) (citing five other federal decisions for the proposition that there was no ground for 
difference of opinion on the issue)). 
 226. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268–70 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 
858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811; see also Aaron 
Gershonowitz, Joint and Several Liability in Superfund Actions: When is Environmental Harm 
Divisible? PRPs Who Want to be Cows, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 209–30 (2003) 
(describing how courts have applied § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to CERCLA 
cases). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965) (discussing divisibility). 
 228. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889. 
 229. Id. at 892. 
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tortfeasors because there was a means of dividing the results of their 
actions, and held that each should be liable for a portion of the costs 
based on a “volumetric basis.”230 
The Atlantic Research Court’s reasoning, which suggests that a 
PRP plaintiff and other PRPs may not be joint tortfeasors,231 could 
provide a broader role for divisibility.  The Court stated that 
“contribution . . . is contingent upon an inequitable distribution of 
common liability among liable parties.  By contrast, § 107(a) permits 
recovery of cleanup costs but does not create a right to contribution.  
A private party may recover under § 107(a) without any 
establishment of liability to a third party.”232  If PRPs are not 
necessarily joint tortfeasors, that is, they do not have common 
liability, then what is the basis for joint and several liability?  
Certainly, the PRP plaintiff will not be jointly and severally liable on 
the contribution counterclaim.  However, if the contribution of two 
PRPs who sent waste to the site is divisible based on one being a 
remediator and one being a reimburser, then other PRPs whose 
relationship to the contamination is categorically different may also 
be able to avoid joint and several liability.  The Atlantic Research 
Court’s reasoning thus suggests a broader use of divisibility. 
E.  Contribution Protection 
The Atlantic Research Court noted that granting a PRP a § 
107(a) claim may interfere with the contribution protection provisions 
of CERCLA that are designed to encourage settlement.  The Court 
acknowledged the problem, but took the position that even if PRPs 
can be § 107(a) plaintiffs and can thus have a cause of action against 
those who settled (i.e., a claim against those who have contribution 
protection), the incentive to settle would not be undermined.233  In 
other words, the Court concluded that some PRPs could have a cause 
of action against a PRP who has contribution protection, but that is 
not a significant concern. 
The Court must have known that some courts had used the 
CERCLA contribution protection provision to defeat claims other 
than contribution claims.  For example, in United States v. Cannons 
 
 230. Id. at 904. 
 231. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 232. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007). 
 233. Id. at 2339. 
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Engineering Corp.,234 the court dismissed common law indemnity 
claims because they were seen as an attempt “to make an end run 
around the statutory scheme.”235  Nevertheless, the Atlantic Research 
Court did not express a concern about any “end runs” around the 
statutory scheme and took the position that a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim 
would not be prevented.236 
What About the Governmental Entity that Reimburses 
Another? 
Is a government entity that reimburses another government 
entity for remediation costs entitled to joint and several liability?  
This is, in a sense, the reverse of the overlap case the Court was 
concerned with.  The overlap case described by the Court was the 
person who performs remediation as a result of litigation.  This 
person is not a volunteer and therefore has a § 113 contribution claim, 
but has also performed remediation, and therefore should have a § 
107 claim.  The reverse case, the nonremediator that is a volunteer, 
may not have a claim under either section because it has clearly not 
“incurred” response costs to have a § 107 claim and, as a volunteer, 
does not have a contribution claim. 
An example of such a case is Town of Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, 
Inc.237  The Town of Windsor remediated a Superfund site and the 
State of New York reimbursed the Town for a portion of its costs 
pursuant to the New York State Environmental Quality Bond Act.238  
The Town and the State brought a § 107(a) action against responsible 
parties and some of the parties moved to dismiss the State’s claim 
because the State, as a reimburser, did not incur response costs.239  
The court concluded that the costs of reimbursing the Town for its 
response costs were response costs.240 
Under Atlantic Research, that issue would be decided differently.  
The Atlantic Research Court concluded that only one who performs 
the remediation has “incurred” response costs.  The State did not 
perform remediation and therefore should not be able to bring a § 
107(a) claim. 
 
 234. United States v. Cannons Eng’r. Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 235. Id. at 92. 
 236. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 237. Town of Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 238. Id. at 319. 
 239. Id. at 319–20. 
 240. Id. at 320. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court began reexamining who may be a Superfund 
plaintiff in Aviall, holding that a PRP who voluntarily performs 
remediation does not have a § 113 claim for contribution against the 
person who caused the contamination.241  The Court left open the 
possibility that such a person may have a § 107 claim. 
The limitation on who could bring a § 113 claim caused a 
reexamination of who may bring a § 107 claim, resulting in the 
Atlantic Research decision, which held that a volunteer who 
remediated the site could be a § 107 plaintiff.242  In order to explain 
how the two sections fit together, the Court addressed the different 
roles the two sections play in the statutory scheme.  The result is that, 
now, a potentially responsible party who remediates a site and 
thereby incurs response costs has rights that are substantially 
different from the potentially responsible party who merely 
reimburses someone else for response costs.  This result raises a 
question about whether such a party would be subject to joint and 
several liability, and this article explained how the Court’s reasoning 
could lead to a reassessment of joint and several liability in Superfund 
litigation. 
The Court also acknowledged, and left open, the question of 
whether the non-volunteer who remediates should be treated like a 
volunteer who remediates.  This article has concluded that the two 
should be treated the same with respect to having a § 107(a)(4)(B) 
claim.  Additionally, this article suggested a procedure for dealing 
with the complicated cases in which a PRP who is a § 107(a)(4)(B) 




 241. See supra notes 32–48 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 49–82 and accompanying text. 
